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ALLEVIATING THE HARMS OF
SUBSTANDARD HOUSING TO WISCONSIN
TENANTS: CORRELATING RENT WITH
ASSESSED PROPERTY VALUE
Like other cities across the nation, Milwaukee utilizes a mix of regulatory,
statutory, and common law tools to address the problem of substandard rental
housing. This Comment examines the efficacy of those legal tools, in the
process demonstrating that existing remedies offer insufficient protections to
tenants in need of habitable housing. This Comment then proposes a novel
legal strategy that is designed to ameliorate the problem of low-quality,
overpriced rental housing: amending Wis. Stat. § 66.1015 to permit
implementation of a “rent-value correlation rate”—giving municipalities the
option to cap monthly contract rent as a percentage of the assessed property
value. Tenants could use the rent-value correlation rate as an affirmative
defense to eviction. And because tenants would finally owe a financial
obligation commensurate with the substandard quality of contracted housing,
landlords might be motivated to maintain or improve the quality of the premises
in order to restore or increase profit margins.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent housing survey, as many as forty-four percent of Milwaukee
renters reported living with “serious and lasting housing problem[s]” for more
than three days, to include broken windows or appliances, mice, cockroaches,
or rats.1 In 2015, almost 20,000 housing units in Milwaukee County were
labeled “deficient” due to open cracks or holes, while another 1,100 units
lacked complete plumbing.2 In 2020, a nonprofit housing organization reported
that Milwaukee County has the highest rate of structural deficiencies within its
housing stock in the state.3
Older, poorly maintained houses and apartment complexes are often riddled
with mold and leaks, or suffering from structural deficiencies such as broken
roofs, windows, and doors.4 Tenants endure failing heating and plumbing
systems, lead hazards, and bedbug and rodent infestations.5 From 2009–2019,
while about 30% of Milwaukee homes were renter-occupied, 62% of electrical
fires occurred in rental units.6 The American Housing Survey has estimated
that fully five thousand or more rental units in the City of Milwaukee constitute
“extremely inadequate housing.”7 For the primarily low-income residents
forced to subsist in such dwellings, these issues present serious habitability
concerns.8
Recent research reveals a counterintuitive truth about the price of such lowquality housing. Data compiled in October 2020 shows that in Milwaukee
census tracts with the lowest median property values, renters are in fact paying
1. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 76 (2016)
[hereinafter DESMOND, EVICTED].
2. YAIDI CANCEL MARTINEZ, JOE PETERANGELO & ROB HENKEN, WIS. POL’Y F., THE COST OF
LIVING: MILWAUKEE COUNTY’S RENTAL HOUSING TRENDS AND CHALLENGES 18 (2020),
https://wispolicyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/CostOfLiving_Full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8BZ-6SFU].
3. See COMMUNITY ADVOCATES PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, Home Is Where Our Health Is:
Policies To Improve The Health Of Renters In Milwaukee And Beyond 40 (2020),
https://ppi.communityadvocates.net/file_download/5a740c6e-b44d-40c3-a498-0c58072590ef
[https://perma.cc/KJN4-XPT9].
4. Id. at 41.
5. Id.
6. Raquel Rutledge, John Diedrich & Daphne Chen, Electrical Fires Hit Milwaukee’s Black
Renters Hardest. Nobody is Held Accountable, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://www.jsonline.com/in-depth/news/investigations/reports/2021/08/25/electrical-firesmilwaukee-pose-higher-risk-poor-black-renters/8061243002/ [https://perma.cc/8BC5-C4HC].
7. COMMUNITY ADVOCATES PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 40 (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted).
8. Jane Ault Phillips & Carol J. Miller, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: Is Rent Escrow
the Solution of the Obstacle to Tenant’s Enforcement?, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1,
28 (2018).
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the highest proportion of monthly rent per unit to assessed property value.9 In
addition to suffering myriad health effects from living in such housing,10 lowincome tenants are well overpaying for it.11
This Comment proposes a novel legal strategy that is designed to ameliorate
the problem of low-quality, overpriced rental housing: amending Wis. Stat.
§ 66.1015 to permit municipality implementation of a “rent-value correlation
rate.” The rent-value correlation rate would serve primarily as an affirmative
defense to eviction and would help to ensure that tenants do not owe excessive
financial obligations relative to low-quality contracted housing. The
correlation rate would spur landlords to improve (or at least maintain) the
quality of the housing in order to elevate property values and maximum rents.
Part II examines the dynamics of the rental housing market in Milwaukee,
using recent data to show that low-income tenants pay exceedingly high rents
for low-quality and even substandard housing. Part III analyzes the legal
strategies currently in place to address the problem of substandard housing,
concluding that existing remedies offer insufficient protections to tenants who
are entitled to safe and habitable shelter. Part IV focuses on the mechanics of
the proposed rent-value correlation rate. For example, a municipality might
decide that landlords may not charge more than 2.5% in monthly rent per unit
as a percentage of the assessed property value. Tenants could then use the rentvalue correlation rate as an affirmative defense to eviction. Because tenants
would finally owe a financial obligation commensurate with the substandard
quality of contracted housing, landlords would be motivated to maintain or
improve the quality of the premises in order to restore or increase profit
margins. Part V concludes that regardless of the political hurdles inherent to
this proposal, the rent-value correlation rate would be a step in the right

9. John Johnson, Milwaukee Housing Tract Statistics, Lubar Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y Rsch. and Civic
Educ. (Oct. 21, 2020) (unpublished data) (on file with author). See Appendices A–C.
10. See Julie Clark & Ade Kearns, Housing Improvements, Perceived Housing Quality and
Psychosocial Benefits from the Home, 27 Hous. Stud. 915, 915–39 (2012); Amy M. Burdette, Terrence
D. Hill & Lauren Hale, Household Disrepair and the Mental Health of Low Income Urban Women, 88
J. URB. HEALTH: BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 142, 142–53 (2011); Wayne Morgan, Results of a HomeBased Environmental Intervention Among Urban Children with Asthma, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1068,
1068–80 (2004); Gary Evans, Nancy Wells & Annie Moch, Housing and Mental Health: A Review of
the Evidence and a Methodological and Conceptual Critique, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 475, 475–500 (2003);
Samiya Bashir, Home Is Where the Harm Is: Inadequate Housing As a Public Health Crisis, 92 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 733, 733–38 (2002).
11. See Johnson, supra note 9; see also DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 353 n.10; see also
James E. Causey, ‘Evicted’ author says Milwaukee’s housing crisis remains unchanged, MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL
(May
9,
2018),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/special-reports/50year/2018/05/09/eviction-crisis-remains-unchanged/574579002/ [https://perma.cc/S299-4ZNK].

MATHESON_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

466

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:463

direction for the landlord-tenant community in Milwaukee and comparable
locales.
II. THE HIGH PRICE OF LOW-QUALITY RENTAL HOUSING IN MILWAUKEE
Low-income tenants in Milwaukee pay the highest proportion of monthly
rent per unit to assessed property value relative to other tenants.12 In one cluster
of homes on Milwaukee’s predominantly African-American north side, for
example, where the median income is $23,531 and the median assessed
property value is $24,359, the median contract rent (excluding utilities) is $686
per month, or three percent of the median assessed property value for that area.13
In Bay View, on the predominantly White south side, by contrast, where the
median income is $59,632 and the median assessed property value is $132,705,
the median contract rent is only slightly higher: $725.14 Unlike the median
contract rent on the north side, that number in Bay View represents not three
percent but one percent of the median assessed property value for the area.15 In
other words, renters in the lowest-income areas of the city—where assessed
property values are the lowest—pay three hundred percent of what landlords
charge as a function of assessed property value in other parts of the city. If the
median assessed property value represents generally the quality of housing in a
given census tract,16 then Milwaukee’s poorest residents are paying exceedingly
high rents for low-quality and even substandard housing.
Novel research published in 2019 by Matthew Desmond—the Pulitzerprize winning author of Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City—
confirms this state of affairs. Using data from a restricted-use U.S. Census

12. See Johnson, supra note 9.
13. Id.; Appendix B.
14. Id.; Appendix C.
15. Id.
16. The first layer of assumption here is that the city-assessed value corresponds with the market
value of the property. See WIS. STAT. § 70.32 (2019–2020) (“Real property shall be valued by the
assessor in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual . . . at the full value
which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale”); see also WIS. DEP’T REVENUE,
WISCONSIN
PROPERTY
ASSESSMENT
MANUAL
9-7,
9-20
(2021)
https://www.revenue.wi.gov/documents/wpam21.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYY6-9N9W]; STANDARD ON
MASS APPRAISAL OF REAL PROP. 5 (Int’l Ass’n Assessing Officers 2013),
https://www.iaao.org/media/standards/MARP_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM8L-367Q]. Johnson’s
research, which shows median assessed value patterns across the city, thus demonstrates market value
patterns as well. Johnson, supra note 9. The next layer of assumption is that market value represents
generally the quality of residential property. In describing the various factors that influence the
assessed value of a residential property, the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (“PAM”) states
that “[a] property in excellent condition generally has a higher value than a similar property in poorer
condition.” WIS. DEP’T REVENUE, supra note 16, at 9-19.
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Bureau survey of landlords, and a recent survey of Milwaukee property
owners,17 Desmond measured “renter exploitation” as the ratio of annual rents
over property value: “Neighborhoods in which rents amount to a higher
proportion of property value are characterized by higher exploitation.”18
Desmond’s data is significantly more comprehensive than the median values
discussed above and provides indisputable evidence that low-income tenants
pay too much for housing in relation to other renters.19 In high-poverty
neighborhoods, exploitation rates “more than double[] as annual rents amount
to 25% of property values.”20 Owing to several factors, “rental properties
located in poor neighborhoods command higher regular profits,” even after
taking landlord expenses into account.21 Indeed, on the national level,
“landlords operating in poor neighborhoods enjoy median profits double those
of landlords operating in affluent neighborhoods.”22 In Milwaukee, a landlord
operating in a poor neighborhood produces a median monthly profit of $151
per rental unit after expenses.23 Landlords in more affluent neighborhoods
make $21 per rental unit.24

17. Matthew Desmond & Nathan Wilmers, Do the Poor Pay More for Housing? Exploitation,
Profit, and Risk in Rental Markets, 124 AM. J. SOC. 1090, 1093 (2019).
18. Id. at 1096; Interestingly enough, investors have long appreciated the usefulness of the rent
over price ratio. From an investor’s perspective, rent-over-price describes potential profit margins and
is thus employed as a crucial tool in deciding whether to purchase a property. See, e.g., Peggy Alford,
Rent Ratio Tells You Whether Renting Or Buying Is The Better Deal, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2010),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2010/11/02/rent-ratio-tells-you-whether-renting-orbuying-is-the-better-deal/?sh=305c215e9d08 [https://perma.cc/MY82-HE9S]. Desmond’s research is
novel in its analysis of a similar number—the rent-to-assessed-value ratio—as a descriptor of tenant
exploitation.
19. Desmond & Wilmers, supra note 17, at 1096–103. Desmond uses the exploitation rate to
emphasize landlords’ monetary gains in the low-income housing market. I focus instead on the rentvalue ratio as representative of low-income tenants’ lack of legal leverage with respect to making
habitability demands on landlords. The more unlikely it is that a tenant will be able to pay their rent,
the more unlikely it is that the tenant will have legal leverage to make reciprocal demands on the
landlord. Even if housing conditions were perfectly equal across Milwaukee, low-income tenants
would have less ability to mitigate habitability concerns based on a decreased likelihood of being able
to pay the rent.
20. Id. at 1103.
21. Id. at 1107–08.
22. Id. at 1108.
23. Id.
24. Id. Desmond explains these numbers as such: “Landlords who have invested in a nonpoor
neighborhood are not betting on today but on tomorrow. In poor neighborhoods, however, landlords
are betting on today.” Id. at 1113.
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In moderate to high-income areas of Milwaukee, by contrast, renters simply
walk away from overpriced or uninhabitable properties.25 If a property is
clearly in poor condition, or the landlord has a poor reputation in the
community, the tenant will look for another place to live—because they can
afford to do so. But in the lowest-income areas, tenants have few alternatives
to renting overpriced, low-quality housing.26
This is because the low-income housing market functions less like a free
market and more like an oligopoly.27 An indigent tenant may not realistically
approach any landlord on the market; they will succeed in renting only from
those landlords who are willing to overlook their poor credit, eviction history,
criminal history, etc.28 The low-income housing market in fact defies the core
economic assumption that “individuals enter markets as equal participants.”29
Even once the tenant enters into an economic relationship with the landlord,
they are treated not as an “equal participant[]” but as one bound by the “traits,
whims, and even mood changes of their landlord[].”30
This is not to suggest that landlords are entirely responsible for the fact of
the unbalanced housing market. As Ezra Rosser has pointed out, even
seemingly “exploitative” landlords in fact operate largely within the confines
of the law.31 Rosser concluded that “[t]he market, combined with a legal
25. Extended Conversation on Housing: Kail Decker and Raphael Ramos, MILWAUKEE MAG.
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.milwaukeemag.com/extended-conversation-housing-kail-decker-raphaelramos/ [https://perma.cc/5JGZ-VCZ4].
26. DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 69 (“Poor families were often compelled to accept
substandard housing in the harried aftermath of eviction. Milwaukee renters whose previous move
was involuntary were almost 25 percent more likely to experience long-term housing problems than
other low-income renters.”); see also Phillips & Miller, supra note 8, at 29.
27. Andrew Van Dam, Economists Identify an Unseen Force Holding Back Affordable Housing,
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/17/economistsidentify-an-unseen-force-holding-back-affordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/P9ZY-QU9S]; see also
Extended Conversation on Housing: Kail Decker and Raphael Ramos, supra note 25.
28. Desmond & Wilmers, supra note 17, at 1116 (“Renters in poor neighborhoods are excluded
from both home ownership and apartments in middle-class communities on account of their poverty,
poor credit, eviction or conviction history, or race (through discrimination) . . . .”); see also Ezra
Rosser, Exploiting the Poor: Housing, Markets, and Vulnerability, 126 YALE L.J. F. 458, 472–73
(2017); Mya Frazier, When No Landlord Will Rent to You, Where Do You Go?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(May
20,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/magazine/extended-stay-hotels.html
[https://perma.cc/Q27M-V8S6].
29. Rosser, supra note 28, at 471. He later concludes that “[t]he notion that the low-income
housing market can be understood as a series of voluntary transactions among equals is undercut by
the relative power of landlords and the desperation of tenants.” Id. at 475.
30. Id. at 471.
31. Id. at 462–63 (“[T]he strongest case for labeling [landlord activity] exploitation is not so
much that [landlords] violate the law but that they exploit the unfair advantages the law provides to
landlords in the eviction process.”).
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structure that largely supports the interests of landlords . . . exploits the inability
of the poor to make meaningful demands on landlords.”32
Part III examines the mechanics of that “legal structure” as it affects
tenants’ ability to make “demands on landlords” related to the habitability of
their homes. Tenants’ interests in safe and habitable housing have been
underemphasized in recent decades, with commentators tending to focus less
on habitability and more so on the economic effects of rent control.33 Though
the national discussion has shifted substantially toward “affordability,” the
problem of substandard housing remains an important national concern.34
Deborah Hodges Bell and Lydia Hodges Suffling have argued that “housing
needs are not met simply by the provision of additional housing.”35 A crucial
problem is the “need for a method by which tenants may require their landlords
to provide habitable dwellings.”36
III. WISCONSIN LAWS IMPOSING LIABILITY FOR SUBSTANDARD HOUSING
There are a handful of legal tools currently in place to address the problem
of substandard housing. For instance, a tenant might sue their landlord for
breaching the contractually implied warranty of habitability. Or a tenant might
sue for breach of explicit lease obligations such as the landlord’s promise to
make timely repairs. In the event the landlord fails to satisfy the implied
warranty of habitability or more explicit contractual obligations, the tenant
might reach out to a regulatory agency in a bid to force repairs.
32. Id. at 474. See also Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination
of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 538 n.14. Like Bezdek’s article,
this Comment aims “less to resurrect [tenants’] particular substantive rights . . . than to expose the
fallacies underlying the granting of ‘rights’ to subordinated people.” Id.
33. Matthew Desmond points out that although policymakers and researchers have concluded
that America “has made impressive strides toward improving the housing quality for its poor,” the
problem of habitability has been unduly pushed to the side as the affordability conversation has taken
hold. See DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 355 n.16. But the problems of habitability and
affordability are “interlocked. At the bottom of the housing market, each permits the other.” Id.; see
also Matthew Desmond & Monica Bell, Housing, Poverty, and the Law, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
15, 29 (2015) (“[A]n overabundance of research on certain housing policies and a paucity of studies
on more elemental aspects of housing markets—means that many questions absolutely central to the
lives of poor families remain largely unanswered.”); Anna Reosti, “We Go Totally Subjective”:
Discretion, Discrimination, and Tenant Screening in a Landlord’s Market, 45 L. SOC. INQUIRY 618,
646 (2021) (“[A]t a time when a reinvigorated sociology of housing has brought attention to the central
role of the rental housing market in shaping patterns of disadvantage, understanding the broader social
context in which fair housing laws play out is particularly important.”).
34. See Deborah Hodges Bell & Lydia Hodges Suffling, In Search of a Habitable Home in
Mississippi, 49 MISS. L.J. 881, 881 (1978); see also DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 355 n.16.
35. See Bell & Suffling, supra note 34, at 881.
36. Id.
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A brief analysis of each of these legal tools will show that their
effectiveness is limited. The problem of substandard housing still plagues
Wisconsin—specifically, Milwaukee—to a significant extent. Though the
existence of substandard housing is unlikely to be solved entirely in Milwaukee
or elsewhere, new legal tools can at least alleviate the problem.
A. Explicit Lease Provisions
To the tenant who enters into some form of rental agreement, the landlord
may owe an obligation to repair the premises. Wisconsin common law has
recognized a landlord’s affirmative duty to make repairs based on explicit lease
provisions since at least 1937.37 That obligation is also codified in Wisconsin
Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection Code (“ATCP”) § 134.07, which
states that every promise to “clean[], repair[], or otherwise improve[] [the
premises]” must be fulfilled by the date or time period specified in the rental
agreement.38
In the event the landlord fails to complete the agreed-upon repairs in the
specified timeframe, the tenant may theoretically bring a breach of contract
action. But for low-income tenants with hourly-wage work, poor health, or
childcare obligations, small claims court is an intimidating forum in which to
raise a claim.39 As the Civil Division of Milwaukee County cautions
prospective small claims filers on its information webpage, a “civil case has
many court hearings. You must appear in person for each one.”40 Even for
tenants with the time to show up to the hearing(s), “[t]he court cannot
help . . . with discovery” or other matters.41 Tenants rarely succeed in
procuring legal representation.42 Unsurprisingly, one seminal court survey
reported that tenants were plaintiffs in just 0.5% of all small claims cases.43

37. Karla A. Fancken, Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Liability: Wisconsin Realtors, Residential
Property Sellers, and Landlords Beware, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 550, 578 (1994); see also Flood v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 626, 149 N.W. 489, 491 (1914) (explaining that “the landlord is liable to
the tenant for breach of contract to repair”).
38. ATCP § 134.07.
39. See Bezdek, supra note 32, at 536.
40. MILWAUKEE COUNTY COURTS, Civil Court: Large Claims, Small Claims, Family and
Paternity,
https://county.milwaukee.gov/EN/Courts/Court-Divisions/Civil-Court
[https://perma.cc/K8EU-8LHP].
41. Id.
42. Around ninety percent of tenants lack representation in housing court. See Nicole Summers,
The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing Court Outcomes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 171 (2020).
43. Bezdek, supra note 32, at 559 n.87.
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For those tenants haled into small claims court as defendants, many have
no knowledge of the defenses available to them.44 The next section, concerning
the implied warranty of habitability, bears this out: even the tenant who
attempts to offer an affirmative defense in eviction court is often stymied by
their understandable lack of familiarity with the intricacies of landlord-tenant
law.45
B. Implied Warranty of Habitability
Aside from explicit provisions, the landlord-tenant relationship is also
governed by the implied terms of the lease.46 Recognizing the “need and social
desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population
increases,” the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v. Perssion became one of
the first courts to recognize an implied warranty of habitability in residential
leases.47 The Wisconsin State Legislature, by the time of the Pines decision in
1961, had already implemented a host of statutes and regulations aimed at
imposing basic habitability requirements on residential properties.48 After
referencing the legislature’s “policy judgment . . . that it is socially (and
politically) desirable to impose [certain] duties on a property owner,” the Pines
court added that “[p]ermitting landlords to rent ‘tumbledown’ houses is at least
a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency and
high property taxes for conscientious landowners.”49 This recognition of the
implied warranty of habitability foreshadowed a national judicial trend toward
recognizing residential leases not as mere “conveyance[s] of an interest in land”
but as contractual agreements.50
The state legislature subsequently codified the implied warranty of
habitability at Wis. Stat. § 704.07 in 1977.51 A landlord has a duty to keep the
premises in a “reasonable state of repair,” to include maintenance of “supply
44. See Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying
the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249, 260 (2018).
45. See infra Section III.B.
46. SUSIE BRIGHT, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW IN CONTEXT 26–27 (2007).
47. See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 59–96, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412–13 (1961); see also
Patricia Jones D’Angelo, Property—Landlord-Tenant—Landlord No Longer Immune from Tort
Liability for Failure to Exercise Reasonable Care in Maintaining Premises. Pagelsdorf v. Safeco
Insurance Co. of America, 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979), 64 MARQ. L. REV. 563, 568 (1981);
Bell & Suffling, supra note 34, at 886.
48. Pines, 14 Wis.2d at 595–96.
49. Id. at 596.
50. See Barbara Maier, Landlord and Tenant Law—The Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Residential Leases, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 192, 195 (1975); see also Bell & Suffling, supra note 34,
at 890–92; see generally Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corps., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. App. 1970).
51. D’Angelo, supra note 47, at 568 n.31.
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services . . . such as heat, water, elevator, or air conditioning.”52 The landlord
must also perform “all necessary structural repairs” and comply with applicable
housing codes.53 Explicit assignment of these duties aside, the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals clarified in 2006 that under § 704.07(4), “Untenantability,”
independent causes of action are restricted to “material” health or safety
violations.54
But the Wisconsin State Legislature appeared to expand subsection (4) in
2018 to justify rent abatement not only for “condition[s] materially affect[ing]
the health or safety of the tenant” but also for those conditions “substantially
affect[ing] the use and occupancy of the premises.”55 Whether this new
language has in fact expanded the range of independent causes of action is
unclear. No court has yet had reason to apply the new language.
Another part of the statute, Wis. Stat. § 704.07(2)(bm), seems in tension
with the implied warranty of habitability. Subsection 2(bm) appears to condone
“building code or housing code violation[s]”—even those that present a
“significant threat to the prospective tenant’s health or safety”—so long as the
landlord discloses the violation before entering into the lease.56 Legal
commentators have suggested that subsection (bm) effectively “allows
landlords to rent out sub-standard apartments.”57 In Wisconsin, the implied
warranty of habitability apparently does not apply to “prospective” tenants.58
All other tenants seeking relief under § 704.07 may pursue various
remedies: full or partial rent abatement, rescission of the lease, or a
counterclaim to the landlord’s action for rent or possession.59 The tenant may
pursue such remedies regardless of the existence or terms of the written lease.60
The availability of such remedies to the tenant theoretically motivates the

52. WIS. STAT. § 704.07(2)(a)(1)–(2) (2019–2020).
53. WIS. STAT. § 704.07(2)(a)(3)–(5) (2019–2020).
54. WIS. STAT. § 704.07(4)–(5) (2019–2020); see also Zehner v. Village of Marshall, 2006 WI
App 6, ¶ 31, 288 Wis. 2d 660, 709 N.W.2d 64.
55. Assemb. B. 771, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2018) (enacted as Act 317).
56. WIS. STAT. § 704.07(2)(bm) (2019–2020).
57. Rosser, supra note 28, at 462; see also Jennifer Senior, Review: In ‘Evicted,’ Home Is an
Elusive
Goal
for
America’s
Poor,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/books/evicted-book-review-matthew-desmond.html
[https://perma.cc/C7WT-MPKV].
58. WIS. STAT. § 704.07(bm) (2019–2020).
59. See WIS. STAT. § 704.07(4)-(5) (2019–2020).
60. Section 704.44 prohibits any lease provision that “[w]aives any statutory or other legal
obligation on the part of the landlord to deliver the premises in a fit or habitable condition or to maintain
the premises during the tenant’s tenancy.” WIS. STAT. § 704.44(8).

MATHESON_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

ALLEVIATING THE HARMS OF SUBSTANDARD HOUSING

473

landlord to maintain the premises.61 In practice, however, the landlord retains
the upper hand.62
Though Wis. Stat. § 704.07 provides for rent withholding and abatement,
the statute says nothing about how to abate rent, and Milwaukee does not have
an ordinance governing rent abatement.63 Rent abatement procedures are
“tricky”64 to the point of defying “common sense.”65 Raphael Ramos, director
of the Eviction Defense Project in Milwaukee, said in an interview in 2018 that
renters naturally withhold rent in full upon discovering rodents, or mold, or
broken heat or plumbing.66 But what these renters tend not realize is that per
§ 704.07(4), total withholding is only permissible if the renter has physically
and justifiably moved out of the property (i.e., constructive eviction).67 The
Eviction Defense Project regularly encounters such clients—renters who have
endured uninhabitable living conditions but who are nonetheless subject to
eviction (in addition to owing back rent) because of their lack of familiarity
with the intricacies of rent withholding and abatement procedures in
Milwaukee.68
Adding to the confusion, housing code violations do not necessarily equate
to “material” health or safety violations for which a tenant may abate or
withhold their rent. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Posnanski v. Hood
61. Maier, supra note 50, at 204 (“The doctrine of implied warranty of habitability and fitness
in residential leases appears to be a progressive dual function doctrine: first, it provides optional
remedies to the tenant where the demised premises are unfit for habitability, and secondly, it serves to
pressure landlords into maintaining the premises they lease.”).
62. See Summers, supra note 42, at 203–04 (“These findings strongly suggest that the warranty
of habitability is not serving as an effective tool to compel the performance of needed repairs.”).
63. Milwaukee is not unique in this respect. See Serge Martinez, Revitalizing the Implied
Warranty of Habitability, 34 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 239, 257 (2020) (“A tenant
facing the threat of eviction for unintentional arrearage is likely to immediately confront procedural
obstacles imposed by legislatures eager to prevent a tenant from raising the implied warranty of
habitability . . . .”).
64. TENANT
RESOURCE
CENTER,
Rent
Abatement,
https://www.tenantresourcecenter.org/rent_abatement [https://perma.cc/S7L4-WMLB].
65. Extended Conversation on Housing: Kail Decker and Raphael Ramos, supra note 25.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. As an illustration of the complexity of rent abatement procedures in Milwaukee, see the
Tenant
Resource
Center’s
“Rent
Abatement”
guidelines
at
https://www.tenantresourcecenter.org/rent_abatement [https://perma.cc/S7L4-WMLB], supra note
64. The process first entails notifying the landlord of the concern and hoping that the landlord takes
action. If the landlord fails to remedy the issue, the tenant should call the Department of Neighborhood
Services (“DNS”) to assess the property. If the DNS finds a code violation, the landlord will be notified
of the repair deadline by mail. If the repairs are still not made, the tenant may then apply to DNS in
order to pursue “City-sanctioned rent withholding” in an escrow account, or the tenant may call another
third party, Community Advocates, in order to seek a rent reduction.
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pointed out that local housing codes do not define “habitability” or
“untenantability.”69 The court in that case refused to sanction rent abatement
as a means of enforcing the housing code despite the defendant’s goal to
“eradicate[e] substandard housing.”70 Were the court to read the housing code
to define “uninhabitability,” judicial proceedings would ultimately supplant
administration regulation.71
Even now, in 2021, the term “untenantability” as used in § 704.07 remains
undefined. One Milwaukee legal commentator has suggested equating the term
with “uninhabitability.”72 The term “habitability violation” is in fact defined
elsewhere in the Wisconsin Statutes at § 66.0104(1) to include a unit that “lacks
hot or cold running water” or lacks a heating system “capable of maintaining a
temperature.”73 Other violations may be found in units that lack electricity,
smoke detectors, or carbon monoxide detectors, or units that are “infested with
rodents or insects” or “excessive mold.”74 This definition would indeed provide
useful context for “untenantability” and “uninhabitability” as referenced
elsewhere in the statutes.75
Even if rent abatement procedures were crystal clear, the remedy would
prove ineffective for many tenants. Jana Ault Phillips and Carol J. Miller
summarize its usefulness simply: “Tenants need faster remedies. They cannot
afford to pay rent in escrow and a second rent for a habitable apartment. If they
continue to live in a mold- or bedbug-infested apartment while waiting for a
remedy, their health will deteriorate and the social injustice continues.”76
The implied warranty of habitability is sound in theory, but difficult to
apply in practice.77 It has even been referred to as “dead letter law.”78 The
University of Chicago Law Review in 2020 published the results of a large-scale
study of the implied warranty of habitability in practice, which found that in
69. Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis.2d 172, 182–83, 174 N.W.2d 528, 533 (1970).
70. Id. at 178, 531.
71. Id. at 182, 533; see also Bell & Suffling, supra note 34, at 894.
72. Tristan Pettit, Act 317: More Changes to Landlord-Tenant Law, WIS. LAW. (Sep. 12,
2018), https://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?volume=91&is
sue=8&articleid=26562 [https://perma.cc/KU56-JV8V].
73. WIS. STAT. § 66.0104(1) (2019–2020).
74. Id.
75. See Bell & Suffling, supra note 34, at 894.
76. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 8, at 26.
77. See Rosser, supra note 28, at 462–63 (“[Milwaukee] is hardly the only city in the country
where the implied warranty of habitability is more of a paper right than a meaningful check on
landlords.”).
78. Id. at 468 (“[T]he implied warranty is largely dead letter law. It does not protect tenants
from eviction and the main question courts ask is whether a tenant is behind in rent, not if there are
questionable conditions in the unit.”).
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New York City housing court, even among tenants with meritorious claims,
less than two percent received rent abatements.79 The study is significant in
another respect: the implied warranty of habitability as it is applied in New
York City does not entail “onerous notice, good faith withholding, or rent
escrow requirements”—cumbersome hurdles that tenants do face in
Wisconsin.80 The author of the study concluded that where such hurdles exist,
“[i]t certainly may be the case that even fewer tenants benefit from the warranty
of habitability.”81
C. Housing Code Regulations
Only after a tenant has notified their landlord of a habitability concern—
and only after the landlord has failed to address that complaint—should a tenant
consider seeking enforcement action under the local housing code.82 As the
Department of Neighborhood Services (DNS) for the City of Milwaukee warns
on its “Complaint Process” webpage, the administrative agency manages over
25,000 residential property complaints each year—“95 [complaints] per day for
every day of the week.”83 The agency encourages tenants to attempt to resolve
housing code violations with the landlord before calling DNS.84
But as numerous observers have pointed out in recent years, landlords are
sometimes unmotivated to make repairs.85 Matthew Desmond in Evicted
profiled one Milwaukee landlord who deliberately stopped maintaining her
properties as soon as they stopped “cash[ing] out.”86 The Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel a few months later published an investigative series entitled “Landlord
Games” that exposed similar abusive practices among a small number of
delinquent landlords,87 colloquially described as “slumlords.”88
The
Milwaukee City Attorney’s Office eventually initiated suit against a handful of
79. Summers, supra note 42, at 150.
80. Id. at 211.
81. Id.
82. The DNS Complaint Process, CITY OF MILWAUKEE DEP’T NEIGHBORHOOD SERVS.,
https://city.milwaukee.gov/DNS/About-Us/Complaints [https://perma.cc/KCA4-B6LB].
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Adam Travis, The Organization of Neglect: Limited Liability Companies and
Housing Disinvestment, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 142, 143 (2019) (“Diminished concerns about the risk
posed by expensive tenant litigation or code enforcement fines . . . might reduce a landlord’s incentive
to assiduously maintain safe and healthy properties.”).
86. DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 152.
87. A Journal Sentinel Watchdog Report: Landlord Games, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (2016–
18), https://projects.jsonline.com/topics/landlord-games/index.html [https://perma.cc/M389-BDTX].
88. Slumlord
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/slumlord [https://perma.cc/4849-AACM].

MATHESON_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

476

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:463

landlords who had “figured out how to play the system, milking properties for
maximum profit, then walking away after they stop[ped] paying taxes.”89 The
same article notes that the city in 2015 filed 937 tax foreclosure suits, “wiping
out $10.5 million in unpaid property taxes for the former owners. That’s a sum
equal to the salaries of 176 rookie police officers.”90

89. Cary Spivak & Kevin Crowe, As Fines Pile up, Problem Landlords Buy More Homes with
Cash–and Neighborhoods Pay the Price, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 23, 2016)
http://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/as-fines-pile-up-problem-landlords-buy-morehomes-with-cash—and-neighborhoods-pay-the-price-b996788-376768471.html
[https://perma.cc/CZZ4-T94T]. Emily Badger explains these landlords’ methodology: “The landlord
is a shrewd businesswoman. She sees opportunity in the foreclosure crisis, buying up ‘other peoples'
failures’ and converting them into lucrative rentals. She knows that a two-bedroom in Milwaukee’s
segregated inner-city rents for about as much as a two-bedroom in a nicer part of town. But properties
in nicer neighborhoods cost more to buy, so the financial returns on rent in the ghetto are far better.”
Emily Badger, Why Losing a Home Means Losing Everything, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/29/how-the-housing-market-exploits-thepoor-and-keeps-them-in-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/9LVY-ANYD]. See also Alexander Ferrer, The
Real Problem With Corporate Landlords, THE ATLANTIC (June 21, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/06/real-problem-corporate-landlords/619244/
[https://perma.cc/C7Y4-MQQP], for an interesting exposition of why large corporate landlords are
uniquely adept at “milking” distressed properties for steep profits by cutting back on maintenance. A
recent analysis of administrative records and survey data from Milwaukee affirms that housing
disinvestment increases when properties transition from individual to LLC ownership. Adam Travis,
The Organization of Neglect: Limited Liability Companies and Housing Disinvestment, 84 AM. SOC.
REV. 142, 142 (2019); see also Cary Spivak, Out-of-state corporate landlords are gobbling up
Milwaukee Homes to Rent Out, and it’s Changing the Fabric of Some Neighborhoods, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.jsonline.com/in-depth/news/2021/04/15/milwaukee-rentalsovertaken-corporate-landlords-raking-profits/6989234002/ [https://perma.cc/T3LA-KDTG].
90. Spivak & Crowe, supra note 89. This Comment is not necessarily based upon the assumption
that assessed property values are determined fairly regardless of zip code. Bernadette Atuahene
exposed Michigan in 2018 for “unconstitutional assessments and property tax foreclosures [that] occur
at a significantly higher rate in Wayne County’s predominately African-American cities than in its
predominately white ones.” Bernadette Atuahene, Our Taxes Are Too Damn High: Institutional
Racism, Property Tax Assessments, and the Fair Housing Act, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2018);
see generally Bernadette Atuahene & Timothy R. Hodge, Stategraft, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (2018);
see
also
Jason
Grotto,
The
Tax
Divide,
CHI. TRIB.
(Apr.
25,
2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-tax-divide-investigation-20180425storygallery.html [https://perma.cc/WSC5-N43X] (“An unprecedented analysis reveals that Cook
County’s unique property tax system created an unequal burden on residents.”); Alexandria Burris,
Black Homeowner had a White Friend Stand in for Third Appraisal: Her Home Value Doubled,
INDIANAPOLIS
STAR
(May
13,
2021),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/2021/05/13/indianapolis-black-homeowner-home-appraisaldiscrimination/5071223001/ [https://perma.cc/4ZZS-XRKU]. The rent-value correlation rate, see
infra Parts IV–V, would ideally be implemented only after a city has confirmed that property assessors
employ uniform evaluation techniques regardless of zip code.
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Though the city has prevailed with some success in major lawsuits against
five or six of these problem landlords,91 housing code violations remain difficult
to enforce on a ground level. When the more typical landlord fails to remedy a
violation by the DNS-imposed deadline, enforcement steps include sending the
debt to collection, issuing an arrest warrant, or imposing a property lien.92 But
in many cases, landlords can simply ignore these consequences. As mentioned
above, one option is to let the property “go back to the city”93—absolving the
landlord of the obligation to pay all outstanding property taxes.94 And though
the landlord retains responsibility for the fines and may be subject to an arrest
warrant on the basis of those outstanding fines, the warrants have little effect.95
Just several months before the Milwaukee City Attorney’s Office initiated
its fight in 2016 to hold “notorious”96 landlords accountable for tens of
thousands of dollars in municipal housing code violations, then-Governor Scott
Walker signed 2015 Wisconsin Act 176 into effect.97 Act 176 limited the power
of municipal government to enforce local housing code, leading Milwaukee
Mayor Tom Barrett to describe it as a “step backward.”98 Prior to Act 176,
“additional” levels of housing inspections had been permitted in certain
91. See generally A Journal Sentinel Watchdog Report: Landlord Games, supra note 87.
92. DNS Enforcement (Court) Section, CITY OF MILWAUKEE DEP’T NEIGHBORHOOD SERVS.,
https://city.milwaukee.gov/DNS/Inspections_Sections/Enforcement [https://perma.cc/BR9F-DDS7].
93. DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 354 n.16.
94. Cary Spivak, Milwaukee is Looking to Force Landlords to Pay Taxes and Stop Gaming the
System,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL
(Apr.
24,
2017),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/investigations/2017/04/24/milwaukee-looking-force-landlordspay-taxes-and-stop-gaming-system/100848528/ [https://perma.cc/58PT-VDMD] (“When the property
can no longer provide adequate rent, the landlord stops paying taxes and lets the city seize it—a move
that erases the tax debt while giving the city title to a rundown house or duplex.”).
95. Cary Spivak, Watchdog Update: Judge Orders Notorious Milwaukee Landlord to Pay up,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL
(June
3,
2016),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/investigations/2016/06/04/watchdog-update-judge-ordersnotorious-milwaukee-landlord-to-pay-up/85504664/ [https://perma.cc/5VC3-MUTG]; see also
Spivak & Crowe, supra note 89.
96. Assemb. B. 568, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2016) (enacted as Act 176); see also Spivak
& Crowe, supra note 89.
97. Act 176 was backed by landlord and apartment owner groups and opposed by the cities of
Milwaukee and Madison. Spivak & Crowe, supra note 89.
98. Cary Spivak & Kevin Crowe, Landlord Games: State Lawmaker Takes Aim at Bad Property
Owners,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL
(Jan.
6,
2017)
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2016/12/15/landlord-games-bad-ownerstarget-dem-lawmaker/95441000/ [https://perma.cc/S9XY-QT7D]. The law has alternatively been
described as “curb[ing] local government’s intrusion into the life of landlords.” Tristan R. Pettit, Act
176: Governor Signs New Landlord-Tenant Bill Into Law, TRISTAN’S LANDLORD-TENANT L. BLOG
(Mar. 7, 2016), https://petriepettit.com/blog/landlord-tenant/act-176-governor-signs-new-landlordtenant-bill-into-law [https://perma.cc/7MQU-VPE9].

MATHESON_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

478

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:463

neighborhoods on the north side of Milwaukee.99 Now, the city may inspect
rental properties only upon “complaint by any person, as part of a program of
inspections . . . under s. 66.0119, or as required under state or federal law.”100
Act 176 effectively repealed city ordinances mandating “certification” of rental
properties in targeted neighborhoods.101 The legislation also specified that the
fee for a subsequent reinspection of a property cannot be more than twice the
fee charged for an initial reinspection,102 which reduced the fee in the city of
Milwaukee from $355 to about half that.103 For the “notorious” landlords who
make a habit of letting their properties go “back to the city,” Act 176
significantly reduced their operating costs.
Scholars have long debated the continuing effectiveness of local housing
codes with respect to both habitability and affordability.104 Overall, there is an
absence of empirical evidence proving that modern housing codes are
beneficial for tenants.105 At least in Milwaukee, enforcement difficulties,
compounded by landlord-tenant laws that favor the former, render the local
housing code an often-ineffective means by which the tenant can address
habitability concerns.
D. Prohibition Against Retaliatory Eviction
Alas, for the tenant whose heater fails in the middle of January, neither the
city’s struggle to enforce fines, nor the implications of Act 176, are top of mind.
Instead, the greatest obstacle to getting the heat turned back on is that of
retaliatory eviction. When a tenant in arrears expresses dissatisfaction with
housing conditions to their landlord or to the DNS, the landlord might retaliate
by filing for eviction.106
99. Tom Daykin, State Law Forces Milwaukee to End Residential Rental Inspection Program,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 7, 2016), https://archive.jsonline.com/business/state-law-forces-cityto-end-residential-rental-inspection-program-b99739922z1-382142131.html/
[https://perma.cc/3ZUZ-LDZ9].
100. WIS. STAT. § 66.0104(2)(e)(1) (2019–2020).
101. Tom Daykin, Common Council OKs Apartment Certification Program, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL
(Dec.
1,
2009)
http://archive.jsonline.com/blogs/business/78224427.html
[https://perma.cc/G57P-TD5K].
102. WIS. STAT. § 66.0104(2)(e)(3) (2019–2020).
103. Spivak & Crowe, supra note 89 (“Until March [of 2016], the procedure could cost a
landlord up to $355 per visit. But a change in state law set a cap on the amount, limiting it to no more
than twice what the initial inspection costs. In the city, that reduced the charge to $120.”).
104. Desmond & Bell, supra note 33, at 21–22.
105. Id.
106. See DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 18; see also Extended Conversation on Housing:
Kail Decker and Raphael Ramos, supra note 25. Few records exist from which to determine how often
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Wisconsin does prohibit “retaliatory conduct.”107 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Dickhut v. Norton affirmed the social desirability of a prohibition
against retaliatory eviction after discussing the problem of “blighted,
substandard and insanitary housing conditions . . . detrimental to the public
interest.”108 Other courts have similarly cited the improvement of public health
and housing conditions as a primary policy in adopting prohibitions on
retaliatory eviction.109
But like the implied warranty of habitability, the prohibition against
retaliatory conduct seems to be useful only in theory. A landlord “may not
increase rent, decrease services, bring an action for possession of the premises,
refuse to renew a lease,” or threaten to do any of those things if a preponderance
of the evidence suggests that the landlord is retaliating against the tenant for
making a “good faith complaint” about the premises or “[e]xercising a legal
right relating to residential tenancies” more generally.110 But the statute also
says that a landlord may still bring the eviction suit if the tenant has not paid
rent.111 In other words, tenants in arrears are not protected by the prohibition.
Regardless of the condition of the housing or the landlord’s obligations under
the explicit or implied terms of the lease, a tenant in arrears becomes an
effectively legal victim of retaliatory eviction if they so much as hint to their
landlord that they might call DNS. The prohibition against retaliatory
eviction—a tool that upon first blush appears to protect a tenant’s right to seek
safe, habitable housing—in fact protects only those tenants who can pay.
Ironically, it is those tenants who cannot pay who are most in need of retaliatory
eviction protections.112
E. Recent Legislative Efforts
As the above discussion of current legal remedies for substandard living
conditions illustrates, tenants’ struggles in housing court are rooted deeper than
personal circumstance. The legal system itself “reinforce[s] the powerlessness

retaliatory eviction actually occurs. Lauren A. Lindsey, Protecting the Good-Faith Tenant: Enforcing
Retaliatory Eviction Laws by Broadening the Residential Tenant’s Options in Summary Eviction
Courts, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 101, 106 (2010).
107. WIS. STAT. § 704.45 (2019–2020).
108. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis.2d 389, 395, 173 N.W.2d 297, 299 (1970).
109. Lindsey, supra note 106, at 110–11.
110. WIS. STAT. § 704.45(1) (2019–2020); see also Dickhut, 45 Wis.2d at 399.
111. WIS. STAT. § 704.45(2) (2019–2020).
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 1977); see also Phillips & Miller, supra note 8, at 28 (“The deficiencies in the process are
exacerbated by the fact that habitability issues arise most often with low-income households.”).
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of tenants’ socially subordinated position” with respect to landlords.113 In many
ways, the system fails to recognize tenants’ substantive rights.114
Due in large part to the 2016 publication of Matthew Desmond’s Pulitzerprize winning book, Evicted, the City of Milwaukee has become more aware of
some of the ways in which its legal system (and that of Wisconsin)
perpetuates—or at the very least permits—the existence of substandard
housing.115 This is not to suggest that most, or even many, landlords or other
participants in the legal process intentionally abuse the system. On the
contrary, most landlords operate in good faith, “merely attempting to earn a
reasonable return on their investments by providing a vital service to our
society.”116
The community itself has taken measures to mitigate some of the problems
described above. In addition to the city attorney’s legal pursuit of certain
abusive landlords from 2016 to 2018, the state legislature recently passed 2017
Wisconsin Act 339, which prohibits buyers with significant outstanding
property taxes or code violation judgments from purchasing property at a
sheriff’s sale.117 The effect of that law has been to prevent the worst housing
code offenders from purchasing additional properties that would likely fall into
disrepair.118 Another piece of legislation enacted around the same time, 2017
Wisconsin Act 104, improved the deed registration process pursuant to a
113. Bezdek, supra note 32, at 538–39.
114. See Bezdek, supra note 32, at 538 n.14 (referring to the “fallacies underlying the granting
of ‘rights’ to subordinated people”); see also DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 104–06 nn.16–17
(discussing the strong implicit bias toward tenants in small claims court); Phillips & Miller, supra note
8, at 28 (“Although some jurisdictions are taking steps to improve tenants’ education and
representation, far too many court systems remain a dead-end for tenants.”) (footnote omitted);
Summers, supra note 42, at 213–17; Lee Harris, Judging Tenant Protections: The Evidence from
Enforcement of Landlord Penalties, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 149, 152 (2011) (“[L]andlords fare
surprisingly well in small claims courts, in spite of pro-tenant protections.”).
115. See, e.g., Causey, supra note 11.
116. Lindsey, supra note 106, at 102; see also Extended Conversation on Housing: Kail Decker
and Raphael Ramos, supra note 25. Milwaukee landlords have been frustrated by recent media
coverage of the city’s rental market. See, e.g., Tristan Pettit, The Landlords’ Side of the Story,
TRISTAN’S LANDLORD-TENANT L. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2020) https://petriepettit.com/blog/landlordtenant/the-landlords-side-of-the-story [https://perma.cc/87NA-WVMR] (“The media also tend to treat
all landlords as large companies making lots of money at the expense of tenants. Did you know that
the vast majority of landlords throughout the U.S. are small ‘mom & pop’ landlords that own rental
property in addition to working a full-time job?”).
117. Assemb. B. 691, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2018) (enacted as Act 339).
118. Cary Spivak, Kevin Crowe & Mary Spicuzza, Lawmakers Call for Banning Landlords Who
Owe Back Taxes and Building Code Fines From Buying at Sheriff’s Sales, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/investigations/2017/11/01/lawmakers-callbanning-landlords-who-owe-back-taxes-and-building-code-fines-buying-sheriffs-sales/815443001/
[https://perma.cc/C2DK-AWQP].
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sheriff’s sale so that the buyer—not the previous owner—is held accountable
for subsequent property taxes and code violations.119
Most recently, Milwaukee County created a “right to counsel” program in
2021 which will be re-evaluated after a six-month trial period.120 The program
provides low-income renters (specifically, those making less than 200% of the
federal poverty level) with free legal representation during eviction
proceedings.121 The city plans to staff the program with twelve lawyers
specializing in housing law.122 A similar program in New York, enacted in
2017, has proved effective: tenants with legal representation during eviction
proceedings were allowed to remain in their homes in 84% of cases citywide.123
The effectiveness of these policies in the Wisconsin rental market remains
to be seen. It may take years, or even decades, to determine whether Acts 104
and 339 have significantly hampered landlords’ ability to exploit the lowincome housing market. In the meantime, the legislature must work to improve
the legal system so that it permits recognition of tenants’ substantive rights.124
IV. THE RENT-VALUE CORRELATION RATE
Though the problem of substandard housing may be unsolvable in the sense
that low-quality and even uninhabitable units cannot be purged entirely from
119. Assemb. B. 253, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2018) (enacted as Act 104); See also Kevin
Crowe, City Wins Injunction Against Landlord, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/investigations/reports/2016/11/03/city-wins-injunction-againstlandlord/93245678/ [https://perma.cc/UUD6-BSYP], for an example of the sorts of issues resulting
from the inadequate deed registration process.
120. Talis Shelbourne, Milwaukee County Has Established a Right to Counsel Program. Here’s
Why Advocates Say it Could Reduce Evictions, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 19, 2021),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2021/07/19/milwaukee-countys-rightcounsel-program-expected-launch-sep1/8011470002/?cid=facebook_Milwaukee_Journal_Sentinel&fbclid=IwAR28GFR7JhySP8vu5374rl
Souy10S5KVAvuZt33Th0TzzbQIivxKSCVPVUc [https://perma.cc/3874-NUUW].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. OFFICE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION,
UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: A REPORT ON YEAR TWO OF IMPLEMENTATION IN NEW
YORK
CITY
23
(2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/services/civiljustice/OCJ_UA_Annual_Report_2019
.pdf [https://perma.cc/92LJ-L9MR].
124. See Bezdek, supra note 32, at 538 n.14 (referring to the “fallacies underlying the granting
of ‘rights’ to subordinated people”); see also DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 104–06 nn.16–17
(discussing the strong implicit bias toward tenants in small claims court); Phillips & Miller, supra note
8, at 28 (“Although some jurisdictions are taking steps to improve tenants’ education and
representation, far too many court systems remain a dead-end for tenants.”); Summers, supra note 42,
at 213–17; Harris, supra note 114 (“[L]andlords fare surprisingly well in small claims courts, in spite
of pro-tenant protections.”).

MATHESON_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

482

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:463

the rental stock, there are still ways to mitigate harms to tenants. As discussed
in the previous section, legal remedies such as the implied warranty of
habitability or regulatory housing codes already provide some measure of relief
to tenants who possess the financial means to utilize such legal tools.125 But for
tenants without means—for the tenant who fears retaliatory eviction should
they call the Department of Neighborhood Services, or for the tenant who is a
few hundred dollars behind on their rent and thus has no leverage in eviction
court—there is currently no practicable way to address the broken toilet or the
rats living in the walls. These tenants must accept the fact of the substandard
housing in which they live or risk eviction.
It is high time to implement a novel legal tool that addresses substandard
housing without imperiling the very tenants it aims to protect. The best (but
scarcely known) proposal along these lines is the “rent-value correlation
rate,”126 a concept originally proposed in 2018 by then-Milwaukee Assistant
City Attorney, Kail Decker.127 As an “exception” to Wis. Stat. § 66.1015, the
rent-value correlation rate would give municipalities the option to cap monthly
rent charged per unit as a percentage of the assessed annual property value (for
example, 2.5%).128 The rent-value correlation rate would serve primarily as an
affirmative defense to eviction and would also help to ensure that tenants do
not owe a financial obligation that is excessive in relation to the low quality of
the contracted housing. Landlords would be motivated to maintain or improve
the quality of the housing in order to elevate property values and maximum
rents.

125. See Sections III.B–C.
126. “Rent” refers to “contract rent”: the rent paid to the landlord (excluding utilities).
127. Kail Decker, We Can Solve Milwaukee’s Noncompetitive Housing Market for the Poor.
Here’s
How.,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL
(July
5,
2018),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/opinion/contributors/2018/07/05/one-solution-milwaukee-evictioncrisis/755848002/ [https://perma.cc/7V7V-GX2C]; see also Extended Conversation on Housing: Kail
Decker and Raphael Ramos, supra note 25; A Shapeshifter in Milwaukee, NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N
(July
18,
2018),
https://www.naahq.org/news-publications/shapeshifter-milwaukee
[https://perma.cc/9KTK-T4CE]. A rent-value correlation standard also appears to have been suggested
by Kevin Burke in 2018. Kevin Burke, A Better Rent Control: Tie Maximum Rents to Assessed
Property Values, BAY CITY BEACON (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.thebaycitybeacon.com/politics/abetter-rent-control-tie-maximum-rents-to-assessed-property-values—-guestopinion/article_4671620e-fcaf-11e8-afa2-bb102b776690.html
[https://perma.cc/Q5TU-6CRD].
Finally, Jonathan Ross in 1987 argued that California should calculate an individual landlord’s
minimum “rate of return” for traditional rent control purposes using the tax-assessed property value.
See generally Jonathan M. Ross, California Rent Control as Applied: Assessed Value as a Measure of
Fair Return, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 715 (1987).
128. Decker, supra note 127.
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The rent-value correlation rate would apply only to residential properties,
or “Class 1” properties, to include one, two, and three-family homes.129
Residential properties comprise at least eighty-eight percent of Milwaukee’s
housing stock.130 The assessed value of such properties does not take rental
values into account because the city does not know whether a residential
property is being rented.131 Commercial properties, which are valued in part on
the basis of recorded rental rates,132 would not be subject to the rent-value
correlation rate.
The rent-value correlation rate would yield only positive outcomes for
tenants, profit-driven but fair landlords, and the community as a whole. For the
tenant who is paying $900 per month to rent a dilapidated house valued at only
$30,000 for annual property tax purposes, they would now have an affirmative
defense to eviction should their landlord attempt to eject them for a few hundred
dollars in delinquent rent. The court will find that they owe nothing at all in
terms of “back rent” if they have paid at least $750 per month (2.5% of $30,000)
for the duration of their tenancy. In other words, the court will dismiss the
eviction suit if the tenant has paid a fair rent in relation to the objective quality
of the housing. Stated yet another way, landlords cannot evict tenants whom
they have been overcharging to live in inadequate housing. The court may grant
the eviction only if the tenant has failed to pay an amount correlative with the
substandard quality of the housing.
A lower rent may provide the added benefit of making it easier for the
tenant to pay.133 The general economic consensus is that a household should
not spend more than 30% of gross income on rent and utilities.134 In the north
side census tract depicted in Appendix B, the median percentage of income

129. See WIS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 16 at 7-14.
130. Marquette University Law School, On the Issues: Who Owns the House Next Door?,
YOUTUBE
28:18
(Oct.
21,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L0KXcD1uvko&feature=youtu.be
[https://perma.cc/9NN9G6JT].
131. Interview with Jeffrey Arp, Bus. Sys. Manager, City of Milwaukee Assessor’s Off. (Jan. 5,
2021) [hereinafter Interview].
132. Id.
133. See Johnson, supra note 9. Tenants in lower-income tracts pay a higher proportion of rent
to income.
134. See Out of Reach: The High Cost of Housing, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. 1 (2018),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQV9-2Y32] (“Affordability
in this report is consistent with the federal standard that no more than 30% of a household’s gross
income should be spent on rent and utilities. Households paying over 30% of their income are
considered cost burdened. Households paying over 50% of their income are considered severely cost
burdened.”).
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spent on gross rent is 39%.135 In a neighboring tract, that number is an
outrageous 50%.136 But under the rent-value correlation rate, a household that
receives a $200 reduction in monthly rent would pocket an additional $2,400
per year, reducing its percentage of income spent on gross rent by about ten
percent.137 For families living below or near the poverty line, that number is
significant.
A tenant who is more likely to make their rent payments is less likely to
accumulate one or more evictions on their record, which means that they are
less likely to remain trapped in substandard housing. Even for the inevitable
group of tenants who remain unable to meet the lower cost of substandard
housing under the rent-value correlation rate, those tenants will at least
accumulate a “fairer” amount of debt.
Courts might see a decrease in eviction filings overall. Landlords who
continue to overcharge for rent might hesitate to file an eviction suit against a
tenant who is just a few hundred dollars delinquent in rent.
From the city’s perspective, the proposal is cost-free on its face. Because
the rent-value correlation rate would be implemented as an affirmative defense
to eviction and not as a proactive regulatory tool, the city need not allocate a
single dollar toward this proposal in the form of agency funds or otherwise.
Indeed, the city may even stand to gain financially.138 Take, as an example, a
landlord who appears to be charging excessive rent in proportion to the assessed
property value, but whose property has in fact been underassessed. In such a
case, the landlord might be motivated to report the true value of the property in
order to restore their ability to charge the rate that they were charging before
the implementation of the rent-value correlation rate. The city would receive
increased tax revenue as a result of the landlord self-reporting the true value of
the property.139
Finally, from the perspective of the profit-driven—but fair—landlord, the
rent-value correlation rate presents no specter of threat. Former Milwaukee
Assistant City Attorney Kail Decker has estimated that under a 2.5% cap, eighty

135. “Gross rent” includes both contract rent and utilities.
136. See Appendix D.
137. (Median household income [$23,531]) / ($200 x 12 mos.) = 10.2%. See Appendix B.
(Median household income [20,969]) / ($200 x 12 mos.) = 11.4%. See Appendix D.
138. Interview, supra note 130. In conversation with Jeffrey Arp, the author learned that a
homeowner may provide up-to-date information about home improvements to the Assessor’s Office
in support of a request for a higher assessed value. Homeowners typically request such increases before
putting a property up for sale. The rent-value correlation rate would incentivize landlord-owners to
report upgrades in real time.
139. Id.
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percent of Milwaukee landlords would see no effect on their rental rates at all.140
A municipality could adjust the cap depending on the percentage of landlords
it is unwilling to shield from the law.141 Only those landlords charging more
than the agreed-upon cap would be directly impacted by the legislation. In this
way, a municipality could use the tool as a scalpel to target slumlord practices
only.
Even the minority of landlords compelled to decrease rents will not be
deprived of a fair rate of return. Matthew Desmond illustrated this point well
in Evicted. Sherrena, the landlord who owned most of the rental housing that
Desmond described on Milwaukee’s north side, summed up her business like
this: “The 'hood is good. There’s a lot of money there.”142 Sherrena’s monthly
mortgage payments rounded out to $8,500, but she collected about $20,000 in
rent.143 After paying the water bill, she estimated that her profits were about
$10,000 a month.144 Desmond described her dozens of tenants as “around or
below the poverty line.”145 Sherrena was especially excited about purchasing a
duplex that cost only $8,500, because after spending about $3,000 on repairs,
“[i]t would take only eight months to make that money back. After that, ‘[the
property] just cashed out.’”146 This rate of return for landlords is not possible
in the Milwaukee County suburbs, where mortgage payments and tax bills are
much higher.147
In discussing his proposal for a rent-value correlation rate with Milwaukee
Magazine in 2018, Decker offered consistent estimations of landlord profit
margins in lower-income areas of the city.148 He pointed to a duplex on the
northwest side, advertised on Craigslist, that had been purchased for $23,000
and most recently assessed at $23,300. The property advertised $650 in
monthly rent for each unit (5.6% rent-value correlation). At that rate, the
140. From October 2016 to October 2017, Decker collected a random sampling of Milwaukee
rental rates (Craiglist.com) and corresponding assessed property values (publicly available data),
calculating rent-value correlation in the process. Of 346 data points, only 70 rent-value ratios exceeded
2.5%. The Excel-recorded data is on file with the author. See Appendix E for a graphical depiction
of these results.
141. The legislature might also set a minimum value for the rent-value correlation rate.
Otherwise, the municipality might be empowered to implement a 1% rate, which would effectively
become traditional rent control.
142. DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 152.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Matthew Desmond noted that “[w]hen it came to return on investment, it was hard to beat
owning property in the inner city.” DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 1, at 152.
148. See Extended Conversation on Housing: Kail Decker and Raphael Ramos, supra note 25.
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landlord would generate around $15,600 per year in revenue—or a 52% rate of
return.149 This landlord could recoup the entirety of the purchase price in just
two years.
Decker has posited that although the rate of return for landlords affected by
the rent-value correlation rate would be lower than what they are accustomed
to generating, the rate of return would still be much higher than the industry
standard for residential property, which is 7% to 8%.150 For the abovedescribed property valued at $23,000, the maximum allowed rent—$290 per
unit—would still yield a 14% rate of return.151
This seems fair. In states that practice traditional forms of rent control,
courts have stated that a “just and reasonable” rate of return must be high

149. When the author asked Decker about his calculations in Milwaukee Magazine, supra note
25, Decker offered these details. The author has updated certain figures to incorporate Matthew
Desmond’s 2019 research, supra note 17 at 1106:
ANNUAL REVENUE: ($650 x 2 units) x 12 months = $15,600
ANNUAL COSTS: (Mortgage Interest: $0) + (Real Estate Taxes: $1200) +
(Insurance: $360) + (Utilities: $0) + (Vacancy: $348) + (Eviction expenses:
$333) + (Maintenance/Repairs: $1,500) = Total annual costs = $3,741
ANNUAL PROFIT: Revenue – Costs = $11,859
Rate of Return on $23,000 purchase price: 52%
Landlords who purchase such cheap properties rarely obtain mortgages, paying instead with cash,
hence the lack of a mortgage payment. See Desmond & Wilmers, supra note 17, at 1107. Median
monthly property taxes in poor neighborhoods in Milwaukee hover around $100. Id. at 1106. Median
monthly insurance costs in Milwaukee range between $20–$30. Id. The calculations next assume that
the landlord charges utilities separately. The 5% vacancy rate is the industry standard. See Milwaukee
Wisconsin
Residential
Rent
and
Rental
Statistics,
DEP’T
OF
NUMBERS
https://www.deptofnumbers.com/rent/wisconsin/milwaukee/#:~:text=The%20rental%20vacancy%20
rate%20is,according%20to%20Census%20ACS%20data [https://perma.cc/7N8K-98RF], with Decker
estimating one eviction per three years ($1,000/eviction). The maintenance estimate assumes that the
landlord purchases the least expensive materials and labor.
150. Norada Real Estate Investments suggested in 2019 that the average rate of return on
residential properties in Milwaukee is well below ten percent: “Rental real estate [in Milwaukee] has
a [return on investment] of around 10% per year, half of which you see in appreciation, half of which
is in returns.” Milwaukee Housing Market 2019: Home Prices & Investment Outlook, NORADA REAL
EST. INVS. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.noradarealestate.com/blog/milwaukee-real-estate-market/
[https://perma.cc/38KD-TM3Y]; See also Beth Braverman, Do You Have What It Takes To Be A
Landlord?, FORBES (Sep. 11, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bethbraverman/2015/09/11/wantto-be-a-landlord-read-this/?sh=357b475e4d2d [https://perma.cc/X2S2-RHS3] (citing national average
rate of return of 8.94%).
151. ANNUAL REVENUE: ($290 x 2 units) x 12 months = $6,960
ANNUAL COSTS: (Mortgage Interest: $0) + (Real Estate Taxes: $1200) + (Insurance: $360) +
(Utilities: $0) + (Vacancy: $348) + (Eviction expenses: $333) + (Maintenance/Repairs: $1,500) =
Total annual costs = $3,741
ANNUAL PROFIT: Revenue – Costs = $3,219
Rate of Return on $23,000 purchase price: 14%.
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enough to encourage good management, to reward efficiency, to incentivize
capital, and to allow landlords to support their credit.152 The Supreme Court
has also said in the price regulation context that “the return to the equity owner
should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises
having corresponding risks.”153 But a return should not be so high that it
“defeat[s] the purposes of rent control []or permit[s] landlords to demand of
tenants more than the fair value of the property and services which are
provided.”154 In that vein, the rate need not match whatever rate existed before
regulation.155
The landlord community might object that the relatively higher rents
imposed upon low-income tenants simply account for higher risks. When the
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel interviewed notorious Milwaukee landlord Will
Sherard in 2016 for “Landlord Games,” Sherard voiced a common sentiment
among the landlord community: “A person like me is an asset,” he said.156
Sherard argued that inner-city landlords frequently deal with nonpayment of
rent and even tenants who destroy the rental units.157 Properties “may be run
down and have ‘mice, rodents, bedbugs, leaky ceilings.’”158 As Decker
acknowledged in his conversation with Milwaukee Magazine, managing one or
two-family rental buildings in low-income areas can be time-consuming and
expensive.159 Managing such properties is associated with “hassle,” “stigma,”
and “stress.”160 High eviction rates deter potential landlords.161
But Matthew Desmond’s 2019 research demonstrates that even after
accounting for maintenance and expenses, median landlord profit margins are
higher in poor neighborhoods.162 Indeed, Desmond’s data demonstrates that
“[p]oor renters pay double—purchasing the good and the risk—but because
[landlord] losses remain infrequent in absolute terms, landlords typically realize

152. Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 350 A.2d 34, 47
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1975); see also Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d, 1001, 1029 (Cal. 1976); Power
Comm’n v. Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585–86 (1952); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 350
A.2d 1, 15 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1975); In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790–91 (1968)
(addressing fairness of price regulation generally).
153. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
154. Troy Hills Village, 350 A.2d at 47.
155. Id.
156. Spivak, supra note 95.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Extended Conversation on Housing: Kail Decker and Raphael Ramos, supra note 25.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Desmond & Wilmers, supra note 17, at 1113.
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the surplus ‘risk charge’ as higher profits.”163 Desmond also pointed out that
“market risk” and “exploitation” go “hand in hand”:
When the Federal Housing Administration redlined black
neighborhoods, creating a dual housing market that enabled
significant exploitation within these neighborhoods, it justified
this decision by claiming that insuring mortgages in black
communities was too risky. Beyond the housing market, a
similar pattern can be observed today in pawnshops, check
cashing stations, payday lenders, and rent-to-own businesses
that cater to low-income consumers and explain high-interest
charges on account of anticipated risk. In short, consumer
exploitation is made possible when a disadvantaged group is
deemed risky and forced to pay a social price.164
In fact, landlord losses “are more often the result of nonpayment and
vacancies than repairs and maintenance costs.”165 By overcharging the tenant,
the landlord in effect creates (or at least exacerbates) the very risk that their
high price is designed to mitigate: the nonpayment of rent.
From the supply side, driving slumlords out of the market would not
necessarily cause a significant drop in available housing. Before exiting the
market, the departing landlord might sell the property to a subsequent landlord,
or even to the tenant. In fact, the law has the potential to increase
homeownership rates in low-income communities. As the rent-value
correlation rate decreases rents, capitalization rates would also decrease as
home prices remain constant.166 With fewer landlords willing to purchase
properties at current prices based on the lowered capitalization rates, home
prices would ultimately drop, too. Those lowered prices would enable some
tenants to purchase their homes.167
163. Id. at 1116.
164. Id. at 1117 (in text citations omitted).
165. Id. at 1117–18.
166. Capitalization rate is used to determine potential return on investment. The “cap rate” is
equal to net operating income (including rental revenue) divided by the current market value of the
asset.
Capitalization
Rate,
CORP.
FIN.
INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/valuation/capitalization-cap-rate/
[https://perma.cc/TF2M-LBYK].
167. There is no uniform support for the proposition that homeownership necessarily contributes
to individual and community economic development. See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen
Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890, 891 (2011) (“In contrast to the prevailing
politico-legal accounts, the empirical evidence reveals a more modest and particularized picture of
citizenship effects. Rather than evincing global personal transformation, homeowners perform
similarly or only modestly better than tenants of comparable residential duration in many domains,
including most types of community organizational participation, neighboring behaviors, some forms
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The landlord’s second option is to retain the property and charge a lower
rent under the new law. Though still living in the same housing conditions, the
tenant would at least pay rent commensurate with the quality of the low-quality
or substandard housing.
In the better case version of this scenario, the landlord not only retains the
property but is also incentivized to maintain or upgrade the premises in order
to increase the property value and corresponding profit margins. The
International Association of Assessing Officers—to whose appraisal standards
the state of Wisconsin adheres—lists several property characteristics as
important in determining residential property values. These factors include
living area, construction quality, effective age or condition, “secondary areas”
such as basements or garages, and “building features” such as bathrooms or
central air-conditioning.168 A landlord who improves their property generally
will see a corresponding increase in property value, which will enable them to
charge a higher rent and collect increased profit over time.169 Until then, the
tenant pays only for the quality of the housing in which they currently live.
Finally—and rather problematically—the landlord might just follow the
path of least resistance and let the property “go back to the city.”170 According
of collective action, and local socializing.”); see also Anne B. Schlay, Low-income Homeownership:
American Dream or Delusion?, 43 URB. STUD. 511, 511 (2006). One recent publication suggests that
homeownership at least promotes community investment in property values. See WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 129–206 (2001). Laurie S. Goodman and Christopher Mayer
have also concluded that “homeownership remains very beneficial for most families, offering both
financial gains and a chance to build wealth.” Laurie S. Goodman & Christopher Mayer,
Homeownership and the American Dream, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 31, 54 (2018).
168. STANDARD ON MASS APPRAISAL OF REAL PROP., supra note 16, at 6. In accordance with
the IAAO’s guidance, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue Property Assessment Manual states that
“[t]he objective of improvement analysis is to determine the highest and best use of the improved
property and to estimate that portion of the total property value which is attributable to the
improvements. In performing improvement analysis, the assessor must create a supportable valuation
for each property, noting relevant characteristics as they relate to physical condition, effective age, and
functional utility.” WIS. DEP’T REVENUE, supra note 16, at 12-19. In this author’s conversation with
Jeffrey Arp of the City of Milwaukee Assessor’s Office on January 5, 2021, Arp confirmed that a
landlord may request that the city inspect the property in order to assign a value increase. Interview
with Jeffrey Arp, supra note 130.
169. The Rental Rehabilitation Loan Program in Milwaukee provides “rehabilitation assistance
to responsible investors who agree to rent to income-eligible tenants.” Rental Rehabilitation Loan
Program,
CITY
OF
MILWAUKEE
DEP’T
CITY
DEV.,
https://city.milwaukee.gov/DCD/NIDC/RentalRehabLoan [https://perma.cc/EY9R-3FHL].
170. Barbara Meier suggests that when a court enforces a warranty of habitability, the landlord’s
only “feasible” options are to abandon the property or to raise to rent to cover repairs. Supra note 50,
at 204. But Maier assumes that the landlord in question is not reaping extraordinary profits from the
current rent. Matthew Desmond’s research suggests that landlords operating in poor neighborhoods
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to the Department of Neighborhood Services, there are already 1,800 homes
listed as vacant in the city of Milwaukee.171 Many of those homes are left to
decay until they are demolished.172 The passage of the rent-value correlation
rate might therefore be accompanied by adjustments to homeownership laws.
For example, the city should be able to intervene earlier than the two-year mark
if a property is falling into rapid deterioration.173 Alan Mallach, the former
director of the department of housing and economic development in Trenton,
N.J., recently opined in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel that:
State laws should provide some way if a property is clearly
vacant and abandoned to expedite giving that to [] someone
who can do something with a property . . . . They might still
be able to rehab it for a reasonable cost. But if that property
sits there for three to four years, it’s just going to deteriorate.174
Policymakers would therefore need to pay close attention to the correlation
rate’s effect on the supply of available rental housing. Should supply drop
noticeably due to landlords abandoning their properties, the City of Milwaukee
would need to double down on its efforts to hold landlords responsible for the
inevitable deterioration of those properties.175
V. ENACTING THE LEGISLATION
The relevant portion of Wis. Stat. § 66.1015 currently reads as follows:
(1) No city, village, town or county may regulate the amount
of rent or fees charged for the use of a residential rental
dwelling unit.
(2) This section does not prohibit a city, village, town, county,
would benefit economically (and have the means to make repairs) even after lowered rents. See
Desmond & Wilmers, supra note 17, at 1117–18. The landlord could feasibly continue to operate
without having to abandon the property.
171. Talis Shelbourne, In Milwaukee, Thousands of Vacant Homes and Lots Threaten
Neighborhood Safety and Property Values, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 15, 2021),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2021/07/15/milwaukees-vacant-homesthreaten-neighborhood-safety-property-values/5026155001/ [https://perma.cc/923S-TPEC].
172. Id.
173. Id. (“[I]t is typically two years before a vacant home can be seized for nonpayment of taxes,
according to the city treasurer's office.”).
174. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Alderman Robert Bauman proposed an interesting plan in July of 2020: that the city should
use about $150 million of incoming federal funds from the American Rescue Plan Act to rehabilitate
700 homes that the city has acquired through property tax foreclosure. The Department of City
Development would be responsible for rehabilitating the homes. Jeramey Jannene, Plan to Renovate
Every City-Owned Home Gains Traction, URB. MILWAUKEE (June 30, 2021),
https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2021/06/30/eyes-on-milwaukee-plan-to-renovate-every-city-ownedhome-gains-traction/ [https://perma.cc/H6SW-VR5S].
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or housing authority or the Wisconsin Housing and Economic
Development Authority from doing any of the following:
(a) Entering into a rental agreement which regulates rent
or fees charged for the use of a residential rental dwelling
unit it owns or operates.
(b) Entering into an agreement with a private person who
regulates rent or fees charged for a residential rental
dwelling unit.
Enacting the rent-value correlation rate might result in the following
changes:
(1) No city, village, town or county may regulate the amount
of rent or fees charged for the use of a residential rental
dwelling unit unless that city, village, town or county enacts an
ordinance in conformance with this subsection.
(a) Any ordinance enacted under this subsection shall set
a maximum amount of rent that can be charged per parcel
per month for all residential units as a percentage of the
tax-assessed value of the parcel. This amount may not be
set below two percent.
(b) The computation of rent under this section shall omit
the actual cost of utilities and shall not include any charges
for optional parking or storage. Required parking or
storage charges shall be included in computing rent.176
Another subsection under (1) would reference implementation of the rentvalue correlation rate as an affirmative defense to eviction and might describe
the mechanics of how the defense works in a courtroom setting.177 Other
subsections would describe how the assessed property value is determined or
even allude to parallel updates to the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture,
Trade, and Consumer Protection code.
As of January 2021, the political makeup of the Wisconsin legislature does
not appear to favor pro-tenant legislation, let alone any form of rent control. In
fact, the prevailing attitude toward traditional rent control is hostile both inside
and outside of Wisconsin (perhaps rightfully so).178 But the rent-value
correlation rate is not, in fact, traditional rent control. The correlation rate
differs dramatically in purpose and substance. Traditional rent control “consists

176. Kail Decker provided the bulk of this suggested draft language in an email to the author.
177. To calculate allowable rent, the court need only divide the assessed property value by the
number of units. That number is divided by twelve. Property Assessment Data, CITY OF MILWAUKEE,
http://assessments.milwaukee.gov/default.asp [https://perma.cc/9RFY-PG5L].
178. Rosser, supra note 28, at 468.
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of caps on price increases within the duration of a tenancy.”179 Under the rentvalue correlation rate, revenues are limited only by the landlord’s investments
in the property. If the landlord makes improvements, they are entitled to recoup
their costs fully in the form of higher rents.
Similar to a novel form of rent control proposed in the Cornell Journal of
Law and Public Policy by Jorge Elorza, the proposal here “challenge[s] the
conventional wisdom to the extent that it assumes rent control can have only
one legitimate purpose—the reduction of tenant’s housing costs.”180 Unlike
traditional rent control, the rent-value correlation rate promotes both
affordability and habitability. As Elorza noted:
Depending on the needs of the local community, rent control
may be designed to address an array of different goals, and
each scheme will have different legal, economic, and political
consequences. Much of the literature has missed these points
and has declared broad pronouncements of the desirability of
rent control without considering its infinite permutations.181
The proposal here addresses the specific needs of Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
where the lowest-income renters are burdened not by skyrocketing rents (as in
traditional rent control cities like New York and San Francisco), but by steadilyoverpriced low-quality housing.182 The rent-value correlation rate is a
“permutation” of rent control in the broadest sense, as the rate designed to
address the legal, economic, and political situation in Wisconsin. In states with
analogous landscapes, the proposal may be considered in similar measure.

179. Rebecca Diamond, What Does Economic Evidence Tell Us About the Effects of Rent
Control?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-economicevidence-tell-us-about-the-effects-of-rent-control/ [https://perma.cc/5W9R-QCFD].
180. Jorge Elorza, Absentee Landlords, Rent Control and Healthy Gentrification: A Policy
Proposal to Deconcentrate the Poor in Urban America, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2007).
181. Id. at 4; see also Deborah H. Bell, The University of Mississippi Housing Law Clinic: A
Local Law Office and Regional Law Center, 61 MISS. L.J. 501, 504 (1991) (“[L]egal tools used in the
rest of the country for addressing housing problems may be lacking or may require approaches and
solutions not common in urban areas of the country.”).
182. Matthew Desmond and Nathan Wilmers also point out that “[i]n low- and medium-cost
housing markets, landlord profit margins are higher in poor neighborhoods; however, in the country’s
most expensive housing markets, cities with comparatively high rents and a high proportion of renters,
owning rental property in affluent communities may be more lucrative.” Supra note 17, at 1119. As
a result, “[n]ew data and further research are needed to systematically identify and explain the
dynamics of different housing markets, contributing to a nuanced and complex sociology of housing
that could replace one-size-fits-all theories and policy prescriptions.” Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Ezra Rosser writes that “[i]t is customary in the wake of an emergency to
call on businesses to refrain from exploiting the emergency through price
gouging.”183 At the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, for
example, then-Attorney General William P. Barr said, “We will not tolerate bad
actors who treat the crisis as an opportunity to get rich quick. . . . [W]e will
aggressively pursue bad actors who amass critical supplies either far beyond
what they could use or for the purpose of profiteering.”184 Regarding the
exploitation of low-income tenants, Rosser observes that the public’s attitude
toward price gouging “does not seem to apply when it comes to poverty.”185
Though medical research has clearly demonstrated the significant negative
health effects of living in substandard housing,186 this “public health crisis”187
remains largely unaddressed.
The mechanics of landlord-tenant law especially compound habitability
issues. The legal remedies currently available to tenants—the implied warranty
of habitability, the prohibition against retaliatory eviction, local housing
codes—provide relief in theory only. New legal tools are needed to provide

183. Rosser, supra note 28, at 475.
184. Memorandum from the Off. of the Att’y Gen. for All Heads of Department Components
and Law Enforcement Agencies (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1262776/download
[https://perma.cc/CY86-S5DV].
185. Rosser, supra note 28, at 475.
186. See Julie Clark & Ade Kearns, Housing Improvements, Perceived Housing Quality and
Psychosocial Benefits from the Home, 27 Hous. Stud. 915, 915–39 (2012); Amy M. Burdette, Terrence
D. Hill & Lauren Hale, Household Disrepair and the Mental Health of Low Income Urban Women, 88
J. URB. HEALTH: BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 142, 142–53 (2011); Wayne Morgan, Results of a HomeBased Environmental Intervention Among Urban Children with Asthma, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1068,
1068–80 (2004); Gary Evans, Nancy Wells & Annie Moch, Housing and Mental Health: A Review of
the Evidence and a Methodological and Conceptual Critique, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 475, 475–500 (2003);
Samiya Bashir, Home Is Where the Harm Is: Inadequate Housing As a Public Health Crisis, 92 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 733, 733–38 (2002).
187. Bashir, supra note 10, at 733–38.
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tenants with meaningful opportunities to pursue the safe, habitable housing to
which they are entitled.188 The rent-value correlation rate is just a starting
point.
ELLEN MATHESON*

188. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.”); see
also Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14 (2000) on The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) (state actors must “ensure
access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation”).
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Marquette University Law School.
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APPENDIX A
Figure 1: Rent-Value Correlation Rate
Monthly Contract Rent Per Unit/Assessed Property Value

*Contract rent describes the rent paid to the landlord (excluding utilities).
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APPENDIX B
Figure 2: Rent-Value Correlation Rate
Monthly Contract Rent Per Unit / Assessed Property Value
Tract 55079008700 - North Milwaukee—Park West
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APPENDIX C
Figure 3: Rent-Value Correlation Rate
Monthly Contract Rent Per Unit/Assessed Property Value
Tract 55079018500 - South Milwaukee—Bay View
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APPENDIX D
Figure 4: Median Percentage of Income Spent on Gross Rent
Tract 55079006400 - North Milwaukee
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APPENDIX E

Monthly Contract Rent per Unit

Figure 5: Current Rent-Value Correlation Rates in Milwaukee

Rent-Value
Correlation
Rate

*Based on Kail Decker’s data collection efforts from October 2016–2017

